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Abstract
Improving population health is not simple. Many instru-
ments are available for changing behavior and consequent 
outcomes. However, the following basic principles should 
guide development of any incentive arrangement: 1) iden-
tify the desired outcome, 2) identify the behavior change 
that will lead to this outcome, 3) determine the potential 
effectiveness  of  the  incentive  in  achieving  the  behavior 
change, 4) link a financial incentive directly to this out-
come or behavior, 5) identify the possible adverse effects 
of the incentive, and 6) evaluate and report changes in the 
behavior or outcome in response to the incentive.
A wide range of financial and nonfinancial incentives is 
available to encourage efficient behaviors and discourage 
costly and unproductive ones. Evidence for the beneficial 
effects  of  incentive  programs  has  been  slow  to  emerge, 
partly because such evidence must show how behaviors 
have changed because of the incentive. Nevertheless, the 
potential  for  incentive  programs  in  health  care  seems 
large, and research should support their design and assess 
their effect.
Premise of Performance Incentives
Microeconomics is the study of how individuals, house-
holds, and businesses decide to allocate resources. These 
decisions  are  typically  associated  with  decision  makers 
who are closely tied to markets where goods or services are 
being bought and sold. However, similar allocation deci-
sions are made in large organizations that are not directly 
connected to markets, such as government agencies, uni-
versities, public utilities, hospitals, and schools. The effect 
of these decisions on the output, quality, and cost of goods 
and services is used to judge the performance of the organi-
zation producing the good or service and of the members of 
the organization whose decisions contribute to production.
As  of  2005,  75%  of  all  private  US  companies  based 
some part of employee pay on measures of performance 
determined by market signals, according to the Institute 
for Corporate Productivity (1). Managers of organizations 
that are not tightly connected to competitive market pres-
sures must use different performance indicators to induce 
efficient and productive choices from their employees.
Deciding on performance incentives is not simple because 
many  instruments  are  available  for  changing  behavior 
and consequent outcomes. Some of these instruments are 
straightforward mandates that are imposed on decision 
makers;  others  involve  financial  penalties  or  rewards 
based on stated thresholds. Organized communication and 
consultation among employees, or “governance by commit-
tee,” is another way to induce desirable performance.
The following are examples of incentive plans that have 
been adopted by private and public organizations:
• To promote a productive and trained state work force, a 
South Carolina program provides scholarship support to 
college students who maintain normal progress (2).
• In New York City, a pilot program pays parents to be 
involved  in  their  children’s  school  performance  and 
health behaviors (3).
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• One of the largest labor market policies in the United 
States, the Earned Income Tax Credit, is a cash incen-
tive for increased earnings targeted at low-income work-
ers.
• Medicare  encourages  physician  training  by  providing 
financial subsidies to teaching hospitals to defray train-
ing costs (eg, salaries of medical residents and faculty).
• In  health  care,  “pay  for  performance”  is  designed  to 
improve efficiency and quality and to lower costs. Under 
these arrangements, health care providers are compen-
sated for meeting performance measures.
Basic Principles of Effective Incentives
The following basic principles may help clarify which 
financial and nonfinancial arrangements are appropriate 
for improving population health outcomes:
Identify the desired outcome. Although obvious, this 
straightforward principle is often violated. Consider, for 
example, a payment scheme designed to improve dermato-
logic screening for patients who are clinically determined 
to be at high risk of skin disorders. Incentives to reward 
primary care doctors for referring such patients to a der-
matologist should be tied to the actual screening, not to 
the referral alone. Rewarding the actions of providers or 
patients for whom change is sought is the key to effective 
compliance (4).
Identify the behavior change that will lead to this 
outcome. In designing financial incentives, the desired 
action  should  be  clearly  identified.  In  the  dermatologic 
screening example, the primary care provider must iden-
tify patients at risk, prescribe the activity, and take steps 
to ensure that the activity takes place.
Determine the potential effectiveness of the incen-
tive  in  achieving  the  behavior  change.  The  degree 
of  provider  or  patient  responsiveness  to  any  financial 
incentive may vary widely. Understanding this response 
involves  determining  the  extent  to  which  the  behavior 
targeted  is  amenable  to  change  through  the  incentive. 
The size of the financial incentive should be appropriate 
to the effort required. If the perceived benefit of the action 
is exceeded by its perceived cost, the incentive will be inef-
fective. Another consideration in evaluating the proposed 
financial  incentive  is  the  importance  of  monetary  gain 
for  decision  makers.  A  financial  incentive  will  typically   
generate  less  response  among  wealthy  decision  makers 
than among lower-income decision makers.
Link  a  financial  incentive  directly  to  this  out-
come  or  the  behavior.  In  the  example  of  improving 
dermatologic screening, any financial payment should be 
directly tied to either the final outcome — documented 
examinations for high-risk patients — or to the actions 
of the primary care provider, for example, 1) identifying 
high-risk patients, 2) prescribing a dermatologic examina-
tion for them, 3) following up with patients to encourage 
the examination, and 4) documenting the results of the 
examination. In 1 option, a flat payment could be attached 
to each step in this process. Alternatively, payments could 
be graduated so that the payment for each step of the pro-
cess would be higher than for previous steps. A graduated 
payment arrangement emphasizes follow-up activities. A 
third option could tie the financial incentive only to the 
final  outcome.  This  arrangement  enables  providers  to 
emphasize the steps they feel are important to achieving 
the objective.
Identify possible adverse effects of the incentive. 
Payments  designed  to  achieve  well-defined  outcomes 
sometimes  have  unintended  consequences  (5).  Because 
true health care “quality” is difficult to observe, incentives 
often  focus  on  easily  observed  metrics  like  the  propor-
tion  of  patients  who  receive  regular  tests  or  engage  in 
prescribed activities. In addition, people tend to allocate 
more effort to the activity that is rewarded, resulting in 
unintended  degradation  of  performance  in  other  areas. 
In the primary and secondary education sector, pay-for-
performance plans have become popular. These plans pay 
teachers and administrators for improving their students’ 
scores on standardized tests. Such incentives can be effec-
tive, but in many instances they have created perverse 
and unproductive behaviors such as “teaching to the test,” 
manipulating test results, encouraging poorly performing 
students to not take the test, or reclassifying students to 
artificially increase performance indicators. In most cases, 
these responses to financial incentives can be traced to 
faulty designs in the incentive arrangement or faulty mea-
surements of performance (6).
Evaluate and report changes in the behavior or 
outcome in response to the incentive. Monitoring the 
results of any incentive arrangement is necessary for its 
long-term success. In addition to reporting outcomes, other 
possible effects of the incentive should be studied.VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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Developing Incentives
A  wide  range  of  financial  incentives  is  applicable  to 
population health, each with advantages and disadvan-
tages (7).
Flat payments for documented behavior
In  this  arrangement,  decision  makers  receive  a  fixed 
payment for attaining a target or undertaking an action. 
Such  incentives  are  simple  to  describe  and  administer 
and are widely used in various policy areas. For example, 
unrestricted  cash  payments  to  low-income  families  for 
choices that increase human capital and break the cycle of 
poverty are being tested in several sites. Such incentives 
are known as conditional cash transfer programs.
A  privately  funded  New  York  City  program  called 
Opportunity NYC offers cash payments to parents if they 
document  particular  actions  designed  to  increase  the 
school  attendance  of  their  children,  improve  their  chil-
dren’s academic achievement, and increase their preven-
tive health visits (eg, documented prenatal care for moth-
ers and health care for young children) (3). The payments 
are substantial and together can raise family income by 
an estimated 25% to 30% (approximately $4,000 to $6,000 
annually). Nonprofit partners pay, for example, $25 for 
attending parent-teacher conferences, $100 for a preven-
tive health screening, and $150 per month for maintain-
ing  full-time  employment.  A  similar  program,  Mexico’s 
Oportunidades, has demonstrated increases in the educa-
tional and health outcomes of its participants, including 
significant increases in school attendance, achievement, 
and preventive health visits (8).
An advantage of such a plan is that it induces initial 
action  that  otherwise  may  not  have  been  undertaken. 
However, such a flat payment does not reward continuity 
of effort after the goal has been achieved. Another disad-
vantage is that decision makers (in this case, parents) may 
be paid for choices they would have made anyway. Such 
payments are “windfalls” to the decision maker and lead 
to unproductive increases in costs to the payer.
Graduated payments for documented behavior
A variation of the flat-payment arrangement is a sched-
ule  that  increases  payments  as  documented  behavior 
moves toward the goal. For example, states operate child 
support enforcement programs with a mix of federal and 
state funds. The federal government matches every $1 a 
state spends on child support enforcement with $2 of fed-
eral funds. The federal government also offers graduated 
incentive payments to states as they achieve better perfor-
mance on specified indicators (eg, the percentage of cases 
with  paternity  established  or  with  on-time  payments). 
Most analyses conclude that these incentive arrangements 
have been effective in increasing total child support col-
lection nationally (9). The advantage of such graduated 
plans is that they maintain and increase the incentive for 
sustained efforts toward attainment of the objective.
Financial penalties
Penalizing behaviors that do not meet goals is a common 
form of financial incentive, especially for environmental 
targets.  The  primary  example  is  the  “effluent  charges” 
policy that has long been advocated by economists. In 1 
variant of this proposal, a target level of emissions (eg, 
carbon dioxide) would be specified for organizations that 
discharge the gas. If they do not meet this target, they 
would be required to pay a fee for each unit of discharge 
beyond the target level.
Penalty  arrangements  also  might  be  appropriate  for 
some  health  care  targets.  For  example,  a  meaningful 
target might be that 80% of a primary care physician’s 
patients have blood pressure lower than 140/90 mm Hg. 
A penalty of $200 could be imposed for every percentage 
point that a provider’s patient base falls short of the target. 
If only 75% of the patient base has normal blood pressure 
after a predetermined length of time, the penalty would be 
$1,000. This negative incentive could also be graduated in 
accordance with the extent to which behavior falls below 
expectations. Although some adjustment for risk is essen-
tial in such an arrangement, the difficulties of specifying 
an appropriate adjustment must be recognized.
Imposing  penalties  for  inadequate  attainment  is  like 
imposing a fine; it signals poor performance. Such a signal 
could lead to provider resentment, discouragement, ero-
sion of loyalty, and opposition to other incentives. From 
the organization’s point of view, imposing penalties avoids 
a  monetary  payment,  whereas  offering  incentives  does 
not. Finally, such penalty arrangements could encourage 
providers to discourage or reject high-risk patients, who 
would then have to seek alternative care arrangements, 
potentially resulting in no care or inferior care.VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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Payment systems for bundled services
Incentive payment systems may be structured to allow 
the decision maker discretion over the bundle of proce-
dures and processes chosen to attain an objective. Such a 
bundled incentive focuses the incentive payment only on 
the overall health outcomes at issue, rather than each of 
the actions or behaviors that lead to them.
Bundled payment arrangements are common in the pri-
vate sector, and are often known as fixed-price contracts. 
For example, a municipality may contract with a private 
construction  company  to  resurface  a  road  but  stipulate 
only the required characteristics of the resurfaced road, 
allowing  the  construction  company  wide  discretion  in 
choosing  the  best  production  process  to  accomplish  the 
resurfacing.
In  health  care,  prospective  payment  systems  provide 
a single comprehensive payment for an episode of care, 
on the basis of the diagnosis. In the context of Medicare 
reimbursement for hospital stays, each patient is classified 
into a diagnosis-related group (DRG) and the hospital is 
paid a flat rate for the DRG (after adjusting for outliers or 
early release), regardless of the actual services provided. 
The motivation for this financial incentive system is to 
establish  a  base  payment  for  providing  a  typical  set  of 
services, thereby eliminating the incentive for providers 
to charge more for profitable — though unproductive and 
discretionary — follow-up services or secondary diagnoses. 
The system lowers costs by reducing lengths of stay, reduc-
ing intensity of care, or improving efficiency of hospital 
operations. However, these incentives may cause provid-
ers to manipulate the demand for services, for example, 
by disaggregating hospital stays into multiple admissions 
or, in the provision of primary care services, attempting to 
attract healthy patients.
Moreover, this sort of incentive arrangement can lead 
to “risk shifting”; for example, by paying a group-specific 
fixed amount, the payer shifts the risk of variable treat-
ment  costs  to  the  health  care  provider.  This  shift  may 
encourage excessively restrictive (and thereby inefficient) 
care than a DRG typically warrants or the movement of 
patients into an inappropriate DRG.
Nonfinancial incentives
Nonfinancial inducements to enhanced performance are 
common. In the private sector, a typical scheme might 
provide  additional  paid  vacation  days  to  high-perform-
ing  workers  or  public  recognition  such  as  employee  of 
the  month.  In  the  education  sector,  schools  might  try 
to  attract  teachers  and  improve  their  performance  by 
streamlining  hiring  practices,  offering  comprehensive 
mentoring,  reducing  class  sizes,  and  providing  strong 
administrative support. In selected settings, these incen-
tives can be effective (10).
Nonfinancial  incentives  may  also  work  in  the  health 
care sector. Although people are often constrained in their 
health care choices, information on the cost and quality 
of providers could result in a reallocation of demand and 
revenue toward providers with the best results. If such 
information  were  mandated  and  widely  used,  hospitals 
and providers might be pressured to improve their per-
formance in the dimensions indicated (11). Comparative 
effectiveness  research  has  been  proposed  to  evaluate 
the  benefits,  risks,  and  costs  of  treatment  options.  To 
affect  medical  treatment  and  reduce  health  care  costs, 
the  results  of  comparative  effectiveness  analyses  would 
have to be not only persuasive but also used in ways that 
change the behavior of providers and patients (12,13).
Conclusion
Designing good incentive programs is difficult. By focus-
ing  rewards  on  choices  that  promote  health  outcomes, 
quality  improvements,  and  efficiency  gains,  health  care 
organizations and their patients appear to have much to 
gain.  However,  some  incentives  may  foster  undesirable 
competition, may become subjective or political, or may 
be poorly aligned with the collegial norms of the organiza-
tion. Evidence for the benefits of incentive programs has 
been slow to emerge, partly because reliable assessment of 
incentive arrangements requires detailed research about 
how  behaviors  have  changed  because  of  the  incentives. 
Nevertheless, the potential for such programs seems large; 
comparative effectiveness research should be considered 
for both financial and nonfinancial incentives. Additional 
research  is  necessary  to  support  the  effective  design  of 
incentive programs and to assess them comprehensively.
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